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**CIA: Fair Game For Questions**

Unless Gen. Maxwell Taylor or some senator lifts the CIA's cloak of secrecy too high, the American public will likely remain in the dark about it. But it is too bad to conclude that the public cannot ask important questions.

Even without shocking disclosures, Central Intelligence is fair game. If one sorts the jumbled cards of the Cuban misadventure it begins to seem that the CIA's error, if one was made, rested on inadequate interpretation rather than inadequate gleaning of the facts.

Director Allen Dulles, scurrying like everyone else from public blame, denies that the CIA misinformed the President or anyone else about Cuba. No doubt, Mr. Dulles is telling the truth. But that little answers the really important question—which is whether such information as the CIA had was properly construed, weighed, interpreted.

Even if the CIA had the best cloak and dagger corps in the world, it would still rely greatly on its men in the Washington headquarters who sort their way through the mountains and valleys of conflicting evidence and seek out an underlying pattern if one exists.

From such facts as we have, it may appear that the CIA had plenty of information but very poor interpretation. The CIA, as it sent its proxy army into Cuba, gambled that when the invaders hit the shore, militiamen would throw down their arms and come over to the anti-Castro side. It would be just like 1959, when Batista's army finally melted into the by-

ways of Havana and ceased to resist Castro.

If this was the plan, it didn't work. For one thing, someone neglected to calculate the historic differences between militias and professional armies. George Washington had a militia, Lord Cornwallis had a professional army. Would the American Revolution have suggested any lessons? Fidel Castro has a militia numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Fulgencio Batista had a small professional army. For centuries, militias, recruited to the tune of patriotic slogans and rigmarole, have behaved differently from professional armies. They have looked to causes as much as to men or regimes.

If the CIA did suppose that Castro's militia would defect, it blundered on a problem to which history might suggest several answers. Even with masterly espionage no government—and no government agency charged with knocking over foreign enemies on the sly—can work its will unless it knows how to use the espionage.

Perhaps General Taylor will turn his attention to this among other failings in government agencies—which are no less than reflections on the inability to use the lessons of history.